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The Role of Levies in Canada’s Digital Music Marketplace 
Jeremy F. deBeer†
other convergence devices onto which music may beIntroduction 
copied. The government is now studying the issue and
has promised public consultations in the very nearusic has been called a ‘‘canary in the digital
future.M coalmine’’ 1 because the fate of the music industry
foreshadows that of the book publishing, movie, televi- Another example of a scheme targeting third partiession, software and video game sector. 2 Each of these rather than music consumers directly is ‘‘Tariff 22’’,creative industries is concerned about sustainability in which had proposed to charge Internet Service Providersthe face of change, although the music industry has been (ISPs) for royalties in respect of music hosted on orthe most talked about lately. The technological, eco- telecommunicated via their networks. After the Supremenomic, cultural and social environment in which all Court of Canada ruled that ISPs are generally not liablemusic creators work is much different than it was even a to pay such a tariff, 5 it was refiled to target Web sitesshort while ago. There is increasing pressure, therefore, to rather than intermediaries. Nevertheless, some commen-revise Canada’s copyright laws to address numerous per- tators in Canada and the United States have suggestedceived problems. that a levy on Internet access should be implemented as
One of the topics being discussed by courts, com- a substitute for traditional copyright laws in the online
mentators and government policymakers is the role of environment. 6
levies, as opposed to traditional copyrights or other alter-
This paper considers whether such initiatives are anatives, as a solution to the challenges of the digital
desirable alternative to the current system of exclusivemusic marketplace. 3 The Canadian music industry has
proprietary copyrights. My goal is not to evaluate thetraditionally built business models upon the exchange of
nuances of any particular levy scheme or proposal, but toproprietary copyrights in free markets, sometimes made
consider the implications of the concept from a specifi-more efficient through collective administration. Simul-
cally Canadian perspective. Despite the generality of thetaneously, the industry has benefited from a variety of
analysis, many of the observations and conclusions aboutpublic funding programs designed to financially support
the viability of levy schemes relate to Canada’s actualspecific parties or activities. Recently in Canada, new
experiences with its existing private copying levy.schemes have emerged or been proposed whereby the
music industry collects remuneration from third parties
The paper concludes that tariffs or levies on thenot directly involved in the use of copyright-protected
products and services of third parties are not the bestmusic.
method to support the Canadian music industry in the
One example is Canada’s private copying levy, digital environment. A new levy should not be imposed
which obliges importers of certain blank media to pay on iPods, digital memory cards, computer hard drives,
remuneration to some music creators on account of other digital devices, nor should there be a levy applied
music copied privately by individual Canadians. The to Internet access. Indeed, Canada’s existing private cop-
levy currently applies only to blank audiotapes and com- ying levy should be eliminated or substantially over-
pact discs (CDs). The Copyright Board of Canada also hauled.
certified a levy on digital audio recorders, such as Apple’s
iPod, although this was overturned on appeal. 4 It is pos- In the long term, the whole idea of exclusive copy-
sible that this levy will soon be expanded to encompass rights will probably require some fundamental
iPods and similar digital music devices, solid-state remov- rethinking, and the shape of the music industry might be
able digital memory products like CompactFlash cards, very different from the one we know now. Forward-
hard disc drives in desktop and laptop computers, thinking commentators who have advocated for revolu-
and/or mobile phones, personal digital assistants and tionary alternatives to the copyright system have there-
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154 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
fore made a valuable contribution to the debate about weighs the revenue that would be earned. The phenom-
the future of digital music and entertainment. enon of copying music for private non-commercial use
was believed to be an example of such a situation.In the near term, however, proposals for radical
Enforcement is also difficult where the law is discon-reform will likely lead to compromise solutions and half-
nected from the social norms that govern people’s beha-measures, which are neither conceptually justifiable nor
viour. 13 It is tough to enforce laws that people do notpractically workable. It is preferable to tweak the existing
believe in. Peer-to-peer file sharing is an example.system of proprietary copyrights and free markets by
promoting and streamlining voluntary collective Sometimes, copyright enforcement is not imprac-
licensing models. These must be supplemented with tical, but is otherwise objectionable. For example, there
stable and generous funding programs targeted directly may be privacy or liberty concerns about monitoring
at Canadian artists and music consumers. private activities. This was apparently the impetus for
world’s first levy scheme, introduced in Germany in
1965. 14 Such concerns were also debated in the recent
Copyright Markets case of BMG v. Doe, 15 where the Federal Court of Appeal
held:o properly evaluate contemporary challenges, one
Citizens legitimately worry about encroachment upon theirTmust begin by acknowledging the complex struc-
privacy rights. The potential for unwarranted intrusion intoture of the music industry. The creation of music, like
individual personal lives is now unparalleled. In an eraother cultural products, is a team sport. 7 The process where people perform many tasks over the Internet, it is
originates with lyricists and composers, the authors of possible to learn where one works, resides or shops, his or
musical works. Performers interpret authors’ works her financial information, the publications one reads and
subscribes to and even specific newspaper articles he or shethrough their performances. Producers (‘ ‘ sound
has browsed. This intrusion not only puts individuals atrecording makers’’ 8) transform performers’ performances
great personal risk but also subjects their views and beliefs toof authors’ works into mass-marketable commodities, untenable scrutiny. 16
like CDs or downloadable digital files. Music was typi-
Ultimately, the Court’s decision was to allow future cop-cally distributed either through retailers or broadcasters.
yright plaintiffs to obtain a court order, in certain cir-In today’s marketplace, however, ‘‘weightless’’ 9 products
cumstances, which would compel service providers toare being distributed through digital music stores, satel-
disclose their customers’ identities. Both the trial andlite transmissions, Webcasts, and various other means. 10
appellate decisions demonstrate, however, that courts doThe marketing chain used to end with music consumers,
recognize privacy objections to copyright enforcementbut that is also changing. Consumers themselves are
and monitoring tactics.often authors and performers, and they increasingly act
as producers and distributors of original or re-mixed Another objection is that copyright markets are inef-
music as well. Any viable option for reform must there- ficient. Copyright law is structured to make it difficult
fore address the concerns of all parties, including con- for users of cultural products to bargain for the rights
sumers. they need and want — for example, the ability to use
Traditional business models in the music industry ‘‘music’’, rather than a separate work, performance,
depend on copyrights and related rights — exclusive recording and broadcast, and the separate rights to
legal rights to do certain acts in respect of music. These reproduce and to communicate those things. This frag-
include most importantly the rights to reproduce and mentation of copyright into various different rights held
perform (or telecommunicate) music, and the right to by different entities is a serious impediment to market
authorize reproductions and performances (or telecom- exchange. 17 In some cases, there are collective societies or
munications) of music. 11 Revenue streams are generated licensing agencies that simplify the process by elimi-
by voluntarily exchanging these rights for royalty or nating the need to negotiate with an individual party.
licence payments in free markets. However, there are an exceptionally large number of
Canadian copyright collectives, and there is still inade-Copyright markets are, of course, artificially created.
quate co-operation amongst these representatives to facil-Music is not naturally rivalrous, excludable or exhaus-
itate the convenient acquisition of multiple rights fromtible, meaning all Canadians can simultaneously sing the
multiple entities. 18same song at the same time without doing the song itself
any true harm. This is different from ‘‘classic’’ 12 private Copyright markets might also be objectionable
property, where one person’s use precludes another’s and where significant portions of copyright royalties flow to
there is a finite supply of goods available. In the music or through intermediaries. Because lyricists and com-
industry, copyright law creates artificial scarcity in order posers often assign their rights to music publishers, and
to drive market transactions. performers often assign their rights to record pro-
Sometimes, the copyright market can fail. This ducers, 19 these corporate intermediaries perform a gate-
might happen where the enforcement of exclusive rights keeping function. Grant and Wood have noted an
is impractical because, for example, there are many alarming trend in the market for cultural goods and
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Five huge record companies control more than 70 per cent Third Party Proxies of dollar volume in sound recordings. . . . The concentration
of media is growing apace around the world. It is harder and
n cases where it is impractical, objectionable or ineffi-harder for ‘‘independent’’ producers to survive, whether in I cient to voluntarily exchange or enforce copyrights inthe United States or in any country where concentration is
increasing. The distribution of cultural products is often in the free market, some countries have introduced levies.
the hands of gatekeepers who reduce choice rather than Such levies vary greatly in scope29 and theory. 30 In
expand it. 20 Canada, after more than a decade of lobbying, the music
industry convinced Parliament that private copying ontoIn theory, greater revenue for intermediaries means
blank tapes was causing significant losses. 31 It seems togreater investment in product development, and so the
have been assumed that a levy was the best way tobenefit to grassroots artists is indirect but nevertheless
address this issue. So, in 1998, Part VIII of the Copyrightreal. This is true to an extent, but it is questionable policy
Act legalized private copying onto some types of blankto entrust responsibility for the development of Cana-
media, and as a corollary, allowed certain rights-holdersdian music to foreign-controlled private entities. ‘‘What
to propose a levy payable by manufacturers andwill happen is a more commercially oriented cultural
importers of those media. 32sector offering fairly homogeneous fair for a mass audi-
ence and selected quality niches for a rich elite.’’ 21 A The breadth of Canada’s levy turns on the defini-
vibrant cultural industry furthers important non-eco- tion of an ‘‘audio recording medium’’ in section 79. It is
nomic values22 that may be neglected in a mass market legal to copy privately using ‘‘a recording medium,
controlled by global gatekeepers. This is especially true regardless of its material form, onto which a sound
in respect of genuinely Canadian music. recording may be reproduced and that is of a kind ordi-
narily used by individual consumers for that purpose,The most recent statistical data (2003) confirms that
excluding any prescribed kind of recording medium’’.foreign-controlled companies dominate the Canadian
Certain authors, performers and producers may proposemusic scene with an 85% market share in sales of
a levy on the same.recorded music. 23 Professor Geist has commented in
detail on Canada’s ‘‘cultural deficit’’. 24 To be clear, the After its first hearings on the matter, the Copyright
deficit Canada suffers is really in the exchange with the Board adopted a flexible and relaxed interpretation of
United States. In the year 2002 Canada’s deficit in cul- ‘‘ordinarily used’’ in order to ensure that blank CDs, a
ture services trade with the United States stood at almost relatively new technology at the time, would be cap-
$1.2 billion, while trade with the rest of the world tured. It held the standard to mean that media are levi-
amounted to a roughly $250 million surplus. 25 A quick able so long as their use for copying music is ‘‘non-
look at the significance of copyright royalty payments to negligible’’. 33 In effect, according to the Board, ordinarily
Canada’s cultural deficit with the United States may be a means not extraordinarily. The Federal Court of Appeal
good indication of the effect of recent copyright reforms. affirmed that this view was not ‘‘patently unreasonable’’
Between 1996 and 2002, Canada’s deficit with the but stopped short of holding that the Board’s interpreta-
United States in copyright royalty payments more than tion was correct. 34
doubled. 26 At the same time, our deficit in trade-mark
royalty payments increased by about one quarter. 27 If Another key phrase in section 79 is ‘‘regardless of its
Canada further amends its copyright legislation to con- material form’’. Following its third hearings on private
form to international agreements, changes to the private copying, the Copyright Board interpreted this to include
copying levy alone could generate ‘‘a substantial increase digital audio recorders, such as the Apple iPod. 35 The
in payments from Canadian consumers to foreign per- Federal Court of Appeal, however, reversed the Board’s
formers and makers’’ — further net outflows could be in decision on this point. The Court of Appeal held that
the tens of millions of dollars. 28 memory is not a leviable medium if embedded into a
device, and felt the decision to extend the levy to iPods
In sum, the traditional business models built on the was for the legislator, not the Board or the courts, to
exchange of copyrights in a free market might be defi- make. 36
cient in several ways. Arguably, exclusive copyrights are
pragmatically difficult to monitor and enforce. Enforce- One interpretation of the Court’s decision leaves
ment may also be objectionable for privacy reasons. Cop- open the possibility that removable digital memory, or a
yright markets might be inefficient, and can lead to a computer hard drive that has not yet been incorporated
concentration of revenue and market power in the into a device, could be subject to a levy in the future. It
hands of foreign corporations at the expense of Cana- may, however, be splitting hairs to call an iPod a device
dian artists. In light of these concerns, it is not surprising and removable or raw digital memory a medium. More
that both copyright-holders and consumers sometimes importantly, such a medium may not be in a form ‘‘ordi-
advocate for levies as a solution, although each group narily used’’ by individuals to copy music. In fact, the
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IBM MicroDrive hard drives or CompactFlash digital Court confirmed the Copyright Board’s ruling that ISPs
memory cards are overwhelmingly used for digital pho- are not typically liable for telecommunicating, or author-
tography rather than copying music. 37 Given the Board’s izing the communication of, copyright-protected con-
lax interpretation of ‘‘ordinarily used’’ this could change tent. 44 Proposed changes to the Copyright Act in Bill
in a heartbeat. On the other hand, the Federal Court of C-60 would require ISPs to pass notices of alleged
Appeal has indicated this issue is more a matter of legis- infringement to their customers or face certain penalties.
lative policy than statutory interpretation or the applica- It would not, however, make ISPs liable for copyright
tion of law to fact. infringement generally. 45 Therefore, SOCAN has
amended its proposed tariff to target music Web sites,We may not have to wait for the courts to resolve
Webcasts and any other ‘‘site or service accessible via thethe question. The Government has identified Canada’s
Internet or a similar transmission facility from whichprivate copying regime as a timely issue, and has com-
content is transmitted to Users’’. 46mitted to engage in study and public consultations on
the matter. 38 Among the most pressing questions will be So far, no tariff would apply to intermediaries in
whether, and if so how, the scheme should apply to their role strictly as intermediaries. But multiple pro-
digital devices, memory cards, computer hard drives and posed tariffs would apply to intermediaries that are in
multi-use digital products in general. any way content providers. Moreover, the idea of a gen-
eral levy on Internet access is by no means dead. SeveralWhereas the private copying levy might apply to
commentators have proposed specifically that Canadiandigital devices in order to address the private reproduc-
ISPs should be made legally responsible for providingtion of digital music by consumers, this is entirely sepa-
remuneration in respect of other parties’ Internet activi-rate from any royalties payable in respect of reproduc-
ties involving copyrighted cultural products. 47tions of author’s musical works by ‘‘online music
services’’ who supply consumers with digital music. 39 The gist of the idea is to enact a regime similar to
And, in addition to authors’ rights, digital music sup- Part VIII of the Copyright Act to apply to Internet activi-
pliers must also worry about performers’ and producers’ ties. Legislative amendments would permit unlimited
reproduction rights. These must be cleared individually non-commercial communications and reproductions. A
through various members of the Canadian Recording correlative levy would be imposed on ISPs, who would
Industry Association (CRIA), 40 or possibly collectively presumably pass the costs to subscribers benefiting from
through different bodies representing music in French proposed new copyright exceptions. The regime would
and English. 41 Believe it or not, this simplistic description apply to music, possibly also to movies and perhaps even
of some reproduction rights-clearance issues in respect of to other cultural products. 48
authors, performers and producers only scratches the
The suggestion to adopt an exemption/levy modelsurface.
for Internet transmissions resembles grander schemes
A whole other scheme is needed to deal with the proposed by some American commentators. Professor
telecommunication of digital music. Under the Copy- Netanel, for example, delineates a comprehensive model
right Act, these are distinct rights that are often held or that would permit private copying, remixes, adaptations,
administered by different entities. ‘‘Tariff 22’’, a proposal modifications, and dissemination of all kinds of commu-
by the Society of Authors, Composers and Music Pub- nicative expressions in both digital and non-digital
lishers of Canada (SOCAN) to collect royalties from form.49 To provide sufficient compensation to creators, a
anyone who communicates music to the public via the levy would be imposed on a broad range of goods and
Internet, had the potential to become such a scheme. services the value of which is substantially enhanced by
peer-to-peer file sharing. Professor Ku also advocates forStrictly speaking, Tariff 22 would have applied to
levies on the sale of Internet services and electroniceveryone who communicated music online, including
equipment, but his model would apply to digital culturalboth Web sites and ISPs. However, by arguing that ISPs
products only. 50 Professor Fisher proposes to alloweither telecommunicate as part of a chain of telecommu-
various uses of audio and video recordings in exchangenication, or authorize their customers to telecommuni-
for a government reward system funded through taxa-cate, SOCAN sought to collect copyright royalties at a
tion of digital recording and storage devices. 51 Professorconvenient checkpoint. 42 Practically, it is doubtful that
Lessig’s model is similar, but he considers it to be usefulSOCAN would have been able to collect royalties from
only for a transitional period, until convenient musicthe innumerable individual persons who communicate
streaming via the Internet makes file sharing obsolete. 52music via the Internet. In other words, because of a
Peter Eckersley, an Australian scholar, has similarly dis-perceived inability to enforce copyright vis-à-vis individ-
cussed the concept of a virtual market — a decentralized,uals who transmit music via the Internet, Tariff 22
software-mediated, publicly funded mechanism towould have targeted third party proxies instead. 43 The
reward digital authorship without restricting flows ofunderlying concept is strikingly similar to Canada’s pri-
information. 53vate copying levy.
When the Tariff 22 debate reached the Supreme Although different in details, all of the aforemen-
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dissemination of music and/or other pop culture should issues, cross-subsidization concerns and outdated
be encouraged and the present copyright system is a assumptions, all of which must be dealt with before a
hindrance. Therefore, a new system is needed to gen- broad exemption/levy scheme would be viable in
erate financial incentives for creators. The solution is a Canada. On balance, the downside of levies outweighs
variant of compulsory licensing. Typically, however, the any upside. In fact, all of the benefits that a levy would
licence fees are paid not by actual users but by third- generate can be obtained more fairly and efficiently by
party proxies, such as manufacturers of electronic hard- other means.
ware or software, or network providers and other
intermediaries. Philosophical Objections 
It is important to distinguish these proposals from The philosophical justifications for granting copy-
ostensibly similar ideas discussed, for example, by Pro- rights to music creators fall into two broad categories. 62
fessor Gervais, 54 the Electronic Frontier Foundation One view treats legal protection as a means to the end of
(EFF), 55 and others. 56 Professor Litman notes that there greater creativity for the benefit of society generally.
are two models for collecting fees to be distributed Under this utilitarian rationale, copyrights are necessary
among creators: a direct blanket licensing fee and levy or only to the extent they constitute an irreplaceable incen-
tax on the sale of goods or services. 57 Professor Gervais’ tive to invest (effort or money) in the creation or dissemi-
model, for example, essentially proposes user fees, which nation of music. The other perspective perceives protec-
are simply brokered by intermediaries and backed up by tion of creative work as a natural right simply formalized
enforceable exclusivity. This type of scheme would be by legal recognition.
voluntary rather than compulsory. 58 Voluntary licensing
Distinctions within the music industry are highlyproposals, unlike exemption/levy schemes, are built on a
relevant here. Authors and performers are living,framework of exclusive proprietary copyrights. Professor
breathing persons who can at least purport to have nat-Gervais advocates for a system whereby copyright is used
ural rights of ownership in their creative output.to normatively coerce consumers into payment of
Whether or not their claim is convincing is debatable,licensing fees, but is in practice rarely or never actually
but at least, prima facie, it is credible. The same is notlitigated. Generally, Professors Gervais and Litman and
true of producers and distributors, which, as unnaturalthe EFF propose to build new business models upon
legal entities, cannot claim they naturally deserve propri-slight modifications to the existing paradigm.
etary protection for their work. If they are to lobby for
Professor Merges has urged us to stick with the legal rights, the argument must rest on utilitarian
three ‘‘golden oldies’’ — property rights, contracts and grounds. 63
markets. 59 Likewise, Professor Leibowitz has emphasized
For those who believe that human authors or per-that we should not ‘‘throw out the baby with the
formers have natural property rights in their work, anbathwater’’ but should instead investigate more carefully
exemption/levy model might seem difficult to accept.arguments surrounding a shift away from an unfettered
On this view, it might be unacceptable for the state tomarket. 60
expropriate artists’ innate property rights by introducing
In my opinion, copyright markets are far from per- a mandatory licensing scheme. Professor Christie has
fect. Yet with some reorganization and streamlining, explained that:
copyrights can work to facilitate a thriving digital music A statutory licence and levy scheme may appear antithetical
market in Canada. The market can give consumers who to a copyright system in which the authors’ rights are para-
wish to pay for access to cultural products the ability to mount. . . . Put simply, a statutory licence and levy removes a
degree of control from the author. Such a scheme effectivelydo so on clear and reasonable terms. Music can be sold
declares that a licence will be imposed, for which compensa-online à la carte, through licensed peer-to-peer smorgas-
tion is received by means of a levy, irrespective of authorialbords and from traditional bricks-and-mortar retailers. consent. This appears contrary to one’s stereotype of the
Despite the music industry’s imprudent delays61 each of principles underpinning European copyright law [that copy-
these business models is already proving to be a viable right is a natural entitlement of the author]. 64
option built upon traditional proprietary copyrights. Indeed, evidence shows that the Canadian music
The next step is to simplify market exchanges, industry was eager to obtain the levy, but reluctant to
rather than undermine them through an expanded accept the concomitant exemption. 65
exemption/levy scheme. It is not my purpose in this Christie has offered a possible explanation for the
paper to elaborate on particular suggestions for emergence of exemption/levy schemes in copyright sys-
reforming the existing system. Instead, the remainder of tems that view authors’ rights as natural. Essentially,
the discussion is aimed at supporting the proposition levies represent a compromise solution that balances
that a levy scheme is not the best way forward. authors’ rights to control their works with users’ rights to
privacy. 66 It has also been suggested that where a right toThe relatively radical concept of substituting third
remuneration is provided for, there exists no basis forparty liabilities for free-market transactions suffers from
authorial control. 67 It is as if acknowledgment of thenumerous flaws. There are possible philosophical objec-
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tion of authorship. This account of the legitimacy of lishing only a nominal threshold for imposing a levy on
private copying levies has potential, but further study is blank media, the levy begins to look, in pith and sub-
necessary to understand whether an expanded levy stance, a lot like an unconstitutional regulation of ‘‘Prop-
system would be philosophically consistent with erty and Civil Rights’’. 74
Canada’s pluralistic copyright framework.
Furthermore, in respect of the ‘‘Taxation’’ issue, the
There is a more fundamental point, however: to the Court suggested that the principle of federalism in
extent that the philosophical underpinnings of Canadian Canada and the existence of a prohibition on intergov-
copyright law permit us to re-evaluate the current ernmental taxation in Canada’s Constitution were rea-
system, we should abandon completely the idea of ex sons to distinguish Australian case law.75 However, the
post compensation based on consumer demand — that technicalities of intergovernmental taxes are not relevant
is what markets do, and what markets do best. 68 When to the determination of whether the levy is a ‘‘tax’’ or a
discussing levies as alternatives to markets, the compen- ‘‘regulatory charge’’, 76 and regardless, the Australian Con-
sation label is misleading. Levy payments have nothing stitution is remarkably similar to ours in this respect,
to do with the use of any particular work, but reflect the indicating that perhaps the Court wrongly distinguished
expropriation of all copyrights-holders’ ability to control the High Court’s decision. 77
use on a macro level. From a policy perspective, levy
Therefore, it is quite possible that a provincial appel-revenues are meant to offset the cumulative effect of
late court or a differently constituted panel of the Federalexempting a class of users from liability for infringement.
Court of Appeal would conclude that Canada’s existingThis should be contrasted with compensatory payments
private copying levy is unconstitutional. Until theon account of individual uses. Viewed properly, levies are
Supreme Court expresses an opinion on the matter,a form of subsidization, not compensation. Once this is
doubts will remain. It is certainly not safe to assume thatrecognized and accepted, then there is no reason that the
an even broader levy would be constitutionally valid.economic incentives to create cultural products must
The constitutional problems inherent in a levy on allcome after the product has been created. The compensa-
digital memory cards, personal computers or Internettion label is, therefore, also unnecessary because the pur-
access may be insurmountable.pose of the exercise would be to generate ex ante
‘‘inducements’’, not ex post ‘‘compensation’’. 69 Levies are
essentially a philosophical halfway point between a
market based on proprietary rights and a system of direct International Treaty Issues 
or indirect public funding. Conceptually, this is very
An expanded exemption/levy scheme may also vio-awkward.
late Canada’s international treaty obligations. 78 For
starters, any copyright exception must pass a three-step
test: it must be restricted to special cases, not conflictConstitutional Constraints 
with normal exploitation of the work, and must notThe Canadian Constitution limits Parliament’s
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of theability to enact any sort of cultural policy it wishes under
rights-holder. A standalone exemption to cover somethe auspices of the Copyright Act. I have dealt with this
types of private copying, without a concomitant levy, isissue in detail elsewhere. 70 Briefly put, the problem is as
apparently acceptable. Time or format shifting under thefollows. Parliament may enact laws in respect of ‘‘Copy-
American doctrine of fair use is separate and apart fromrights’’, but the provinces control ‘‘Property and Civil
that country’s compensation scheme for digital audioRights’’. Of course, by following proper procedures, Par-
home recording. 79 By contrast, the European Commu-liament can also impose laws about ‘‘Taxation’’. But Par-
nity’s Copyright Directive states that private copyingliament cannot just tax Internet access or personal com-
exemptions are only permitted on condition that rights-puters, and by calling it ‘‘copyright’’ make it so, at least
holders receive fair compensation, which would presum-not for constitutional purposes. This problem may not
ably require the introduction of a levy. 80 Some mightbe insurmountable in the United States, where the
argue that a levy is necessary whenever the cumulativeSupreme Court seems to have given Congress consider-
effect of an exception is significant from a commercialable leeway to promote science and useful arts. 71 But
standpoint. 81 Yet this would seem to suggest that thereAustralia’s exemption/levy scheme was struck down as
should be a levy for pretty much any exception, whichunconstitutional. 72 In Canada, levies are vulnerable to
clearly there is not.attack on similar grounds.
The Federal Court of Appeal has recently affirmed The more pertinent issue, however, is whether
the constitutionality of Canada’s private copying levy. 73 attaching a levy to a broad exemption would successfully
However, the Court dealt with the ‘‘Copyrights’’ issue repel a challenge based on the Berne/TRIPs three-step
only briefly, and seems to have ignored evidence of the test. Commentators are generally cautiously optimistic
levy’s legal and practical effects. When one fully con- that a levy scheme could be drafted to pass this test. 82
siders the broad legal and practical effects that flow from Eckersley, while arguing that it remains possible, illus-
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alternative compensation camel could be squeezed Substantial delays are unavoidable. In fact, a
through the Article 13 eye of the TRIPs needle.’’ 83 majority of the revenues generated under Canada’s pri-
vate copying regime have not been distributed. The firstFurther complications regarding a broad exemp-
step of disbursing funds to the collectives representingtion/levy scheme in Canada arise in the context of
particular classes of rights-holders has been drawn-out,looming treaty obligations. As things now stand, one of
and it is unclear whether any funds have ultimatelythe primary advantages of the existing Canadian private
reached real Canadian artists yet. 88 The Copyright Boardcopying levy is that it disproportionately benefits Cana-
has recognized that these delays are not the fault of thedian, as opposed to foreign, creators. Consistent with
umbrella collective responsible for administering theCanada’s obligations under Berne/TRIPs, the existing
levies. 89 They are instead an inherent problem withlevy scheme compensates both Canadian and foreign
levies generally. Unfortunately, specific data on thisauthors of musical works. Foreign authors get ‘‘national
matter may never emerge, as the Copyright Board hastreatment’’ — they are treated no differently than Cana-
little ability to monitor or supervise the distribution ofdian authors. The same is not true for foreign performers
the levies. 90and producers. Only Canadian performers and pro-
ducers are entitled to a share of the revenues collected Most proposals espouse a detailed tracking system
under Canada’s current levy scheme. Perhaps our favour- of one sort or another to address the issue of revenue
itism will eventually backfire by undermining the system distribution. Such systems may be feasible in the long
of reciprocity at the heart of international copyright law, term, but uniform implementation will require tremen-
but for the time being Canadian performers and pro- dous co-ordination and commitment. Moreover,
ducers are disproportionate beneficiaries of our lopsided detailed tracking systems may undermine any privacy
levy. From Canadians’ perspective, this is a good thing. gains made by substituting exclusive copyrights with an
exemption/levy scheme.But Canada is a signatory to the WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). Ratification (or A second, more problematic, type of cross-subsidiza-possibly even ‘‘implementation’’) of this treaty might tion is external. Exemption/levy schemes put the onushave a serious impact on the distribution of levy reve- on innovative technology and communications enter-nues. 84 The WPPT requires national treatment for per- prises to subsidize the music industry. One might argueformers and producers. Were Canada to live up to these this is justified on three possible grounds — causation,obligations, it would significantly increase the number of enrichment or convenience. However, it is much toocreators entitled to a share of levy revenues. This means a simplistic to suggest that suppliers of blank media orsmaller piece of the pie for Canadian creators, or a bigger Internet connectivity, for example, cause private copying.pie funded by Canadian consumers. Either way, The argument that third parties are profiting directly orCanadians lose. As mentioned, net outflows could add indirectly from private copying is also not a sufficientup to tens of millions of dollars. 85 reason to impose a levy on their goods or services. Nor is
The Standing Committee on Copyright Reform simple convenience.
asserted in its May 2004 Report that ‘‘the private copying
Causation, enrichment and convenience have neverregime does not prevent Canada’s ratification of the
been organizing principles in copyright law. As Profes-WPPT’’. 86 Strictly speaking that might be true, but ques-
sors Lemley and Reese have recently put it :tions about Canada’s ability to ratify this treaty are dis-
‘‘Unrestricted liability for anyone who is in any waytinct from the distributional issues that may arise fol-
involved with such copyright infringement is a badlowing ratification. Most recently, the March 2005
idea. ’ ’ 91 Nevertheless, American and AustralianGovernment Statement on Proposals for Copyright
lawmakers have begun to impose copyright liability forReform reopened the question of the current system’s
secondary, tertiary or quaternary infringement. 92 Canadavalidity under the WPPT.87
has, thus far, resisted such pressures. An expanded
exemption/levy scheme targeting third party proxies
would represent a dramatic shift in Canadian law andCross-Subsidization 
policy.
Exemption/levy schemes entail the drawback of
cross-subsidization. This is a problem in two ways. First, Indeed, imposing a burden on third party providers
the higher the number and more variable the type of of goods or services for such reasons would run contrary
rights-holders who become entitled to remuneration, the to fundamental principles established in the context of
more difficult it is to distribute levy revenues on a just contributory liability, such as MGM v. Grokster93 and
and timely basis. Indeed, simply determining what con- Sony-Betamax94 in the United States, and CCH Cana-
stitutes a just basis for distribution is problematic. Rev- dian Limited v. Law Society of Upper Canada95 in
enue generated on account of certain works ends up Canada. The latest word from the United States
subsidizing other works, because it is impossible to pre- Supreme Court is that contributory liability may be
cisely correlate the collection and distribution of funds attributed to ‘‘one who distributes a device with the
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shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps verify. And if costs were in fact passed on to consumers,
taken to foster infringement . . .’’. 96 The rule ‘‘premises the net financial effect would again depend on the price
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and con- elasticity of demand for levied products. Higher prices
duct’’. 97 Very few, if any, third parties whose goods or for blank media, iPods, personal computers or Internet
services would be levied under the typical exemp- access may result in lower demand, ultimately causing a
tion/levy proposals could be characterized in this way. loss of revenues. Levies can also result in significant
market distortions by encouraging grey or black marketsThe Federal Court of Australia recently decided that
for levied products. This is a serious and real concern forthe promoters of the Kazaa peer-to-peer file sharing
all parties affected by Canada’s existing private copyingsystem were legally responsible for authorizing copyright
levy. 105infringements. 98 But the Chief Justice of Canada, writing
for a unanimous Supreme Court, explicitly rejected the Fundamentally, the argument that the burden of
principles of Australian law upon which that decision levies is probably passed from providers of goods and
was based: ‘‘The [Australian] approach to authorization services to consumers does not resolve the issue of cross-
shifts the balance in copyright too far in favour of the subsidization. The higher up the chain one goes, the less
owner’s rights and unnecessarily interferes with the accurate the charge becomes. In respect of the private
proper use of copyrighted works for the good of society copying levy, the Federal Court of Appeal has acknowl-
as a whole.’’ 99 edged that: ‘‘Such a scheme cannot be perfect; it is a
rough estimate, involving possible overcharging of someSimply providing the means to facilitate, or bene-
and undercharging of others.’’ 106 Although some users offiting from copyright infringement is not itself objection-
the product or service in question — blank media, per-able in Canada. Even if a blank media manufacturer or
sonal computers or Internet access — will engage in theISP could be said to authorize the copying or communi-
copying or communication activities at the root of thecation of music, courts must presume they do so only so
scheme, a great number of others will not.far as it is in accordance with the law.100 To be held
liable based on conventional principles of Canadian cop- Take the following concrete example. All blank CDs
yright law, the alleged authorizer must have a degree of manufactured in or imported to Canada are subject to a
control over the actions of actual copyright infringers. 101 levy to compensate for the fact that some blank CDs are
Because providers of would-be levied goods and services used for copying music. The Copyright Board found that
usually do not control the actions of their customers, an ‘‘between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of individual
obligation to remit payments to copyright holders on consumers who buy blank CDs do so in some measure
account of their customers’ use of music runs contrary to for the specific purpose of copying pre-recorded music.
the basic tenets of Canadian copyright law and policy. Moreover, it appears that over 40 per cent of individuals
use recordable CDs for no other purpose’’. However, theIt might be suggested that third party targets of
highest estimates suggest that of all blank CDs bought inlevies actually benefit from the existence of exemp-
Canada, the proportion of blank CDs used by consumerstion/levy schemes. The argument that legalizing private
to copy music (as compared to those used by businesses,copying increases sales of copying hardware and software
or for copying data or photographs, for example) isis difficult to refute or verify. 102 It assumes first that legal-
roughly one third. 107 The levy rate is discounted toizing an activity will make it more prevalent. Peer-to-peer
reflect this fact, but the point remains that purchasers ofactivities, however, may be influenced more by social
two thirds of all blank CDs subsidize the few consumersthan legal norms. 103 Second, it assumes that music cop-
who use these media heavily for copying music. Simplyying and blank media are complementary, so that if the
put, the levy has a much larger effect on persons who docost of copying music (in terms of legal risk and/or social
not engage in private copying than on persons who do.stigma) declines, demand for blank media will rise. This
is probably true, but more information is needed to The over-breadth of Canada’s private copying levy is
determine whether this increase will be sufficient to more than just an unfortunate side effect for
offset the decreased demand attributable to higher technophiles. It is a very serious issue for thousands of
prices. If demand were inelastic, an exemption/levy Canadian manufacturers, retailers and commercial pur-
might have little effect. 104 But one cannot generalize chasers of goods and services that are or would be levied.
about the range of products that might be levied. Fur- For example, imagine the effect that a levy on Internet
thermore, even if there were some financial benefit to access would have on e-commerce or educational uses of
these third parties, levies entail a substantial administra- the Web. If the Government were to extend the levy to
tive burden. Technology and communications firms are digital memory generally, without amending the
simply not in the business of collecting, accounting for meaning of ‘‘ordinarily’’ as interpreted by the Board, the
and remitting levies, nor should they be. same problem might arise in respect of memory cards,
The net effect of levies on providers of levied goods personal computers, mobile telephones, personal digital
and services is unlikely to be positive. Most people take assistants or a range of other digital devices. Remember,
for granted that costs are eventually passed on to end the iPod is also a personal agenda, portable data storage
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phone and video player. There is no way to distinguish In principle, a levy on pre-recorded music might
customers who fill these devices with music from those focus the burden of levies more precisely on the activities
who do other things. As technological advances lead to that justify their existence. First, the groups intended to
increasing product convergence, this problem will only benefit could collect the levies directly. Administrative,
be exacerbated. opportunity and other transaction costs that are cur-
rently imposed on manufacturers, importers, distributorsMoreover, consumers of these media may pay for
and retailers of levied products could be reduced orthe same activity two or even three times over. For
eliminated. Second, it would insulate non-copiers fromexample, someone who purchases a song from Apple’s
any effect of the levies. The burdens would fall insteadiTunes Music Store contractually acquires the right to
only on those who consume music. By building themake certain private copies of the track. They are
value of private copying into the source of music, a levyexpressly entitled to ‘‘burn and export’’ tracks ‘‘for per-
on CDs and downloads could be calculated to accountsonal, non-commercial use’’. 108 Yet this consumer would
for all spin-off copies that might eventually be madepay again for the same activity through the private cop-
from that original source. Although there could be freeying levy on blank CDs. Furthermore, there is a possi-
trade issues to work around, such a levy might even bebility this consumer could still be sued for copyright
structured so as to favour Canadian creators over for-infringement if, for example, the burning process
eigners by reducing or eliminating the levy payable oninvolved making a copy on a personal computer.
sales of Canadian music.
Double-dipping in this manner is likely to cause
One may argue that a levy on pre-recorded musicresentment amongst consumers. This may ultimately
would exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problemsjeopardize the viability of the levy scheme. Worse, con-
faced by authorized music distributors. The primarysumer hostility toward industry tactics could actually
objection would be that increasing the price of music byundermine the implementation of creative new business
adding a levy might drive even more consumers tomodels.
obtain music from unauthorized sources. Yet, blank
Unfairness might be alleviated through carefully tai- media manufacturers and importers could easily cite
lored exceptions, which can in theory turn levies from similar fears in respect of the market for their products. It
blunt instruments into precise tools. However, separating seems unfair that technology and communications firms
the wheat from the chaff is not easy. If Canada’s current should bear a burden that the music industry itself
private copying regime is any indication, things do not would be unwilling to accept. Even if a levy on pre-
bode well for a potential levy on digital memory or recorded music is not ultimately a viable alternative,
Internet access. The Federal Court of Appeal, affirming merely raising the idea forces us to consider why a levy
the Copyright Board of Canada on this point, recently on third-party proxy goods and services would be more
noted that Part VIII of the Copyright Act contains no acceptable. When all of the cross-subsidization issues are
legitimate exemptions for the vast numbers of con- illuminated, this question becomes difficult or impos-
sumers and, more importantly, businesses, who purchase sible to answer.
blank media for purposes other than private copying. 109
The Court agreed with the Board’s insights that there are
fundamental problems with the ad hoc waiver program Outdated Assumptions 
that has developed, because it is administered unilater-
ally by the beneficiaries of the levy. 110 At a minimum,
From Copyright Holders’ Perspective therefore, the Board ought to be given express jurisdic-
tion to monitor an exemption scheme as part of any Perhaps the most basic reason not to adopt a
would-be broader levy. broader exemption/levy scheme in Canada is that the
need has never been convincingly demonstrated. AndInsofar as a levy is necessary or desirable, a more
even if there was such a need in the past, fundamentalprecise alternative might be to impose the charge at the
legal and technological changes have occurred that callsource, not the destination, of copies of cultural products.
into to question the primary rationale for levies — thatThis suggestion is not entirely without precedent. For
proprietary copyrights are practically unenforceable. Theexample, the French film industry is supported in part by
assumptions that were thought to underlie Canada’sa levy on cinema tickets. 111 In the context of music, one
existing private copying regime are no longer applicable.option is to levy pre-recorded CDs and paid downloads,
from which all copies ultimately originate. On one hand, technological measures (commonly
Some might argue that, in fact, private copying is called TPMs) give creators an unprecedented ability to
already factored into the price of music at the point of control consumers’ use of digital music. All music sold
sale. Certainly, this is explicitly acknowledged with online, and many new CD releases contain copy-protec-
authorized downloads that include the right to make tion measures. Such measures may dictate, for example,
copies. It is also implicitly the case with copy-protected how many copies consumers can make or which sorts of
CDs that allow consumers to make copies in some ways devices can be copied to. One of the most thorough
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should be phased out as these tools become available to sures’’. 118 Note, however, that a general discount in the
control private copying activities. 112 levy rate would avoid supplying a windfall to music
creators, but would do nothing to address the cross-It is true that no technology is entirely unassailable,
subsidization concerns discussed above.but in fact, technological measures are typically criticized
for being too effective. Most commentators who have In general it seems as if the Government, through
looked at this issue have confirmed that Canadians need Bill C-60, has created a hierarchy whereby protection for
protection from these technologies, although some disa- technological measures is more important than the con-
gree. 113 Because technological measures can help to ceptual or practical integrity of the private copying
create viable new business models for the music scheme. In doing so, it has apparently expressed a prefer-
industry, such measures should probably not be prohib- ence for technological measures over private copying
ited outright. Some form of regulation, however, is war- levies as a solution to some of the problems of the digital
ranted to safeguard consumers’ rights and protect music market. But the ambiguity in respect of the Cana-
Canadians’ privacy. dian Government’s intention highlights the urgent need
for study and comprehensive legislative reform in thisRecent lawsuits around the globe provide further
area. Unfortunately, the Government has decided toevidence that exemption/levy schemes are unwarranted.
evaluate these two fundamentally related matters sepa-Although it is impossible to sue every alleged infringer, it
rately, prematurely dealing with technological measuresis unnecessary to do so. Laws are most effective when
and/or unduly delaying private copying issues. Provisionsoperating in the background, influencing social norms
addressing technological measures in Bill C-60 shouldand facilitating the voluntary exchange of rights and
not be adopted into law until this issue is sorted out, orobligations. As Professor Gervais points out, the
at least until the Government is clear about its inten-recording industry’s problem with peer-to-peer networks
tions.is not the impracticability of licensing the activity but
the difficulty of influencing social norms surrounding In sum, by choosing to embrace technological pro-
this technology. 114 Of course, lawsuits are not the first- tection measures and sue music consumers, the industry
best solution to the industry’s woes. But the concern is may have precluded itself from arguing that levies are a
more about public relations than logistics. necessary response to the impossibility or impracticality
of enforcing its copyrights.It should be noted that the Copyright Board and
the Government have implicitly recognized that techno-
logical and legal developments have undermined con- From Copyright Users’ Perspective 
ventional assumptions about private copying, and subtly
For many consumers who are proponents ofindicated an intention to phase out Canada’s existing
exemption/levy schemes, the attractiveness lies mainly inprivate copying levy. 115
the exemption aspect of the quid pro quo. Some have an
The formula adopted by the Board for setting the ideological hostility toward copyright generally. Others
levy rate contains a calculation recognizing that techno- might simply be concerned about the potential for abuse
logical measures allow some consumers to pay directly inherent in statutory monopolies, privacy issues, market
for private copying rights. 116 As this practice becomes efficiency or the siphoning of copyright royalties to for-
more widespread, the Board may be willing to reduce eign corporations. It is tempting to conclude that an
levy rates accordingly, perhaps eventually approaching exemption/levy model is capable of addressing such con-
zero. To be clear, however, there is no guarantee that this cerns, while at the same time recognizing the value of
will happen. music and supporting the Canadian industry. On a
If Bill C-60 becomes law, it would not allow the closer look, however, it would seem that an exemption
circumvention of technological measures for the purpose that covers the normal activities of most digital music
of private copying, although circumventing for other consumers is either (a) unnecessary, or (b) unrealistic.
non-infringing purposes would be permitted. 117 This res- From the consumer’s perspective, the assumption
ervation — that one cannot circumvent to copy for pri- that a specific exemption/levy for private copying and
vate use — is somewhat mysterious. It prohibits con- other non-commercial activities is necessary may be out-
sumers from making private copies, even though they dated. Time or format shifting, archiving backups and
have paid for the right to do so through the levy. In personalizing compilations are all possibly examples of
effect, this would allow the music industry to be remu- ‘‘fair use’’ in the United States. 119 In Australia, on the
nerated for copies that individuals cannot make. The other hand, it seems that these activities are not per-
only possible explanation is that the government is mitted despite the fact that everybody is doing it. 120 This
depending on the Copyright Board to factor this into has led one copyright expert to remark: ‘‘Australian law
consideration when setting the levy rate. If that is the is an ass.’’ 121 The House of Lords would apparently agree:
case, the Government would be wise to say so. The
From the point of view of society the present position isEuropean Community’s Copyright Directive expressly lamentable. Millions of breaches of the law must be com-
references the need for levies to take ‘‘account of the mitted by home copiers every year. Some home copiers may
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warning notices on records, tapes and films. Some home pretation’’ 129 of ‘‘study’’ — one that does not overlap
copiers may break the law because they estimate that the with ‘‘research’’. A plain language interpretation of
chances of detection are non-existent. Some home copiers ‘‘study’’ might, therefore, include copying to watch ormay consider that the entertainment and recording industry
listen to (i.e., study) copyrighted content in private as fairalready exhibit all the characteristics of undesirable
monopoly — lavish expenses, extravagant earnings and dealing. This could conceivably cover time or format
exorbitant profits — and that the blank tape is the only shifting, especially in light of the factors outlined by the
restraint on further increases in the prices of records. Supreme Court for determining what is ‘‘fair’’. 130 TheWhatever the reason for home copying, the beat of Sergeant
basic point is that the CCH v. LSUC decision seriouslyPepper and the soaring sounds of the Miserere from
challenges conventional assumptions about the need for,unlawful copies are more powerful than law-abiding
instincts or twinges of conscience. A law which is treated and value of, exemptions offered to consumers in
with such contempt should be amended or repealed. 122 exchange for third party levies.
In Australia, a review is underway to determine what to
Regardless, aside from a possible fair dealing argu-do about the issue. 123
ment, the potential upside for consumers under anIt is not clear whether Canadian law needs fixing to exemption/levy scheme is more apparent than real. Thesolve this particular problem. A decade ago, when reason, in short, is that it is politically, economically andCanada’s private copying levy was introduced, courts and legislatively unrealistic to obtain all of the exemptionslegislators seemed convinced that copyright was an necessary to share digital music online.instrument for the benefit of creators alone. The weight
of opinion at that time was that distinctions between the For example, the private copying exemption in sec-
American concept of ‘‘fair use’’ and the Canadian law of tion 80 applies to a narrow genre of truly private copying
‘‘fair dealing’’ meant private copying was clearly illegal in onto certain types of media. Consumers wishing to exer-
Canada. cise their putative rights may be caught infringing copy-
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has issued a right for a number of incidental activities. As mentioned,
series of landmark decisions, all of which emphatically a consumer who burns a song to a blank CD using a
endorsed the notion of balance in copyright law.124 A personal computer may well have made multiple perma-
credible argument can now be made that many private nent or ephemeral reproductions onto a personal com-
non-commercial uses of music are ‘‘fair dealing’’ in puter — as things now stand, a device that is not an
Canada. This would render the private copying exemp- ‘‘audio recording medium’’. 131 Even if expanded to cover
tion in section 80 of the Copyright Act redundant in iPods and personal computers, the private copying levy
some cases, 125 and call into question the value of a could conceivably apply to music downloading, but
broader exemption/levy scheme for consumers. uploading is another matter. Uploading implicates tele-
communication rights, which are typically owned andThe Supreme Court of Canada unanimously agreed
administered by distinct entities. It may implicate distri-that systematic for-profit legal research carried out by
bution or other rights as well, which would add anothertens of thousands of Ontario lawyers is fair dealing. 126 An
layer of nearly insurmountable complexity. A right toindividual’s downloading activities for the purpose of
download would soon be fairly useless without a corre-consumer research, to evaluate a potential music
sponding right for others to upload. And even supposingpurchase for example, would seem far less objectionable
that an exemption/levy scheme of this sort were feasible,than that. Given the speculative nature of the fair dealing
it would still apply only to uploading and downloadingdefence generally, the argument is difficult to apply pro-
of music. Those consumers wishing to share or privatelyspectively en masse, but could certainly succeed in a
copy other products, such as movies, books or software,bona fide case with a proper factual and evidentiary
would be required to clear all necessary rights in thebasis. This might require, for example, an affidavit as to
traditional manner.the consumer’s copying habits and intentions, or refer-
ence to some of the empirical data suggesting a positive
For an exemption/levy scheme to succeed, funda-correlation, if any, between downloading and music
mental and wholesale changes in the existing copyrightsales. 127
system would be necessary. It is a mistake, therefore, for
The Supreme Court also sanctioned the Great consumers to believe that a levy is a realistic trade-off for
Library’s telecommunication of works to persons who anything more than a narrowly tailored exemption for a
are fair dealing as an integral part of the research pro- limited class of activities, which may already be per-
cess. 128 Although an analogy to posting music on the mitted. Exemption/levy proposals tend to divert atten-
Internet is inexact, the implications of the Supreme tion from the more moderate possibilities. For user-rights
Court’s ruling for more limited types of uploading has advocates who would like to see meaningful changes in
yet to be explored. their lifetimes, efforts would be better spent promoting a
It is also unclear how ‘‘private study’’ might be inter- shift from a categorical list of acceptable activities to an
preted following the Supreme Court’s ruling. It would open-ended and principled right of fair dealing, 132 cou-
make sense for a court to put heavy emphasis on the pled with proposals for streamlined voluntary collective
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much greater than arguing for a comprehensive exemp- problem is establishing selection criteria, such as poten-
tion/levy scheme to satisfy consumers’ needs. tial or past performance, subjective merit or some other
measure. Also there is the risk that public funding pro-To sum up, various assumptions about the need for
grams can constrain freedom of expression and lead tolevies are outdated. From copyrights-holders’ perspective,
state control over culture. But, as long as one is notthe music industry has clearly demonstrated that there
advocating a centrally planned welfare scheme for artistsare both technological and legal means to create func-
and cultural entrepreneurs, where the Department oftional business models to address online uses of digital
Canadian Heritage becomes our cultural soup kitchen,music. From consumers’ perspective, an exemption to
such concerns are largely illusory. 136address the types of activities typically engaged in is
either unnecessary or unrealistic. Empirical evidence shows that public funding in
regional cultural industries pays off, by encouraging a
thriving cultural community, and in terms of spin-off
economic activities. 137 Data also shows that publicOther Alternatives to Copyrights 
funding programs are inherently more efficient than a
evies spread the burden of funding the music levy scheme when it comes to generating and distrib-L industry amongst technology and communications uting revenue to cultural creators. The average
firms and their customers rather than the public at large. expense/revenue ratio for the Canada Music Fund is
But recall the classic utilitarian argument in favour of about 11%.138 The Canadian Private Copying Collective
copyright, that copyrights encourage the production of (CPCC), an umbrella organization responsible for
cultural products like music for the good of society as a administering Canada’s private copying levy, most
whole. If it is true that society as a whole reaps the recently reported a ratio of 15%.139 I am not suggesting
benefit of a healthy and vibrant Canadian music that the whole system of collectively administered copy-
industry, it would seem fair that society as a whole, not rights could or should be replaced by the Canada Music
just a particular economic or sector or group of con- Fund. But the numbers demonstrate that levies are a
sumers, contribute to such a goal. relatively inefficient method of supporting Canadian
Grant and Wood describe a ‘‘toolkit’’ that govern- music. Government programs can and should comple-
ments can use to support popular culture, including ment a streamlined system of collective administration.
funding for public broadcasting, scheduling or expendi-
ture requirements for private broadcasters, subsidies or
tax incentives, foreign-ownership rules and competition
policy measures. 133 The Canada Music Fund, for Conclusion example, assists the Canadian music industry through
various initiatives supporting songwriting, composing, xemption/levy schemes are conceptually and practi-new musical works, specialized music, market develop- E cally awkward, may be beyond the constitutionalment, sound recording entrepreneurship and the preser- legislative competence of the federal government, andvation of Canadian music collections. Canada’s music may violate Canada’s international treaty obligations.industry can be encouraged through increased education There is no principled reason to impose the burden ofand training in the music sector, or by formal or levies on third parties in the technology and communi-informal recognition and awards for artists. cations industries. Such shotgun approaches, which
Also, public funding programs need not focus exclu- splatter liability around with the hope that some of the
sively on the creation of cultural products, but should intended targets will be hit, may cause unacceptable col-
actively support dissemination as well. 134 In other words, lateral damage in the war on putative piracy. Contrary to
emphasis should be placed on supply-side and demand- traditional assumptions, exemption/levy schemes are
side cultural subsidies. Consumers should be encouraged unnecessary given current technological, legal and
to choose Canadian music, and be rewarded for doing market conditions in Canada. Where necessary and
so. appropriate, traditional market mechanisms can be sup-
Funding public support programs for cultural indus- plemented by public funding programs targeted at spe-
tries is sometimes difficult and controversial. 135 One cific artists or activities in the music industry.
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the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Treaties, their Interpretation and Implementation (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
Encouragement Theory’’ (1989) 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1343; T.G. Palmer, ‘‘Are versity Press, 2002) at 310–317, 340–342.
Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property 82 Eckersley, supra note 3; Fisher, supra note 3 at 44; Gervais, supra note 3 atRights and Ideal Objects’’ (1990) 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y. 817; W.J.
34-35.Gordon, ‘‘On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitu-





































































The Role of Levies in Canada’s Digital Music Marketplace 167
84 See Status Report on Copyright Reform submitted to the Standing Com- nated as technological measures become available, regardless of the
mittee on Canadian Heritage by the Minister of Canadian Heritage and extent to which technological measures are in fact utilized. This would
the Minister of Industry, online at: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/ provide an added incentive for the music industry to create innovative
incrp-prda.nsf/en/rp01134e.html. business models built upon these technologies rather than relying on
levy revenue as a source of income. See Hugenholtz, supra note 3.85 Rushton, supra note 28.
116 Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 4 at 62.86 Interim Report on Copyright Reform, Standing Committee on Copy-
right Reform, online: http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfocomDoc/Docu- 117 Bill C-60, supra note 45 at s. 27.
ments/37/3/parlbus/commbus/house/reports/herirp01/07-rap-e.htm. 118 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
87 Supra note 38. 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and
related rights in the information society, art. 5(2)(b).88 See Canadian Private Copying Collective, ‘‘Financial Highlights’’, online:
http://cpcc.ca/english/finHighlights.htm. 119 See Melville Nimmer and David Nimmer, eds, Nimmer on Copyright
(New York: Mathew Bender, 1997–) (loose leaf) at vol. 4 s. 13.05[F][5][a]89 Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 4 at 61.
pp. 13-265–13-271; Sony, supra note 94; Recording Industry Association90 See Copyright Act, supra note 8, sections 83(13) and 84. of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th
91 Mark A. Lemley and R. Anthony Reese, ‘‘Reducing Copyright Infringe- Cir. 1999).
ment Without Restricting Innovation’’ (2004) 56 Stanford L. Rev. 1345 at 120 Weatherall, supra note 3.1349.
121 Ibid. at 11.92 Ibid., citing Michael Landau, ‘‘Has the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Really Created a New Exclusive Right of Access?: Attempting to Reach a 122 CBS Songs Ltd v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc, [1988] AC 1013 at
Balance Between Users’ and Content Providers’ Rights’’ (2001) 49 J. 1060.
Copyr. Soc’y USA 277, and Dan L. Burk, ‘‘Anti-Circumvention Misuse’’ 123 Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department, ‘‘Fair Use and(2003) 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1095. Other Copyright Exceptions: An Examination of Fair Use, Fair Dealing
94 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) and Other Exceptions in the Digital Age’’, Issues Paper, May 2005.
[Sony]. 124 SOCAN v. CAIP, supra note 5; CCH v. LSUC, supra note 95; and
94 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336.
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